Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance by Juan Manuel Julio
 - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá -Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum





A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem
is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further ine±-
ciencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly
the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.
1 Introduction
Starting with the 100th Law of 1993 and during the last 15 years the Colom-
bian Central Government enacted a series of laws and constitutional amend-
ments to reform the national pension system. Aside from few exceptions,
all retirement bene¯ts o®ered by public and private ¯rms were banned and
a parallel mandatory system was established. Currently, every working age
Colombian chooses between the De¯ned Bene¯ts system managed by the
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Government's Social Security O±ce, and the Individual Accounts with Sol-
idarity system managed by Private Pension Fund ¯rms.
The key di®erence between the two systems is the risk over the monthly
pension their members are entitled to. In the de¯ned bene¯ts system the
mandatory savings go to a collective fund and the pension is a ¯xed per-
centage of the reported historical income. In the individual accounts with
solidarity system, however, a ¯xed percentage of the monthly individual sav-
ings goes to an individual account, and the pension depends on the balance
of this account at the age of retirement. Therefore, in the individual ac-
counts with solidarity system the pension depends critically on the Pension
Funds' investment performance.
The contract signed between Colombian citizens, represented by the Cen-
tral Government, and Pension Funds, to manage the individual accounts
in the individual accounts with solidarity system may be understood as a
principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance. The prin-
cipal (Colombian citizens represented by the government), assigns a task
(the management of the mandatory individual savings account) to an agent
(Pension Fund ¯rms), which, after its execution, produces revenue to the
principal (the returns on the fund's investments). However, the revenue
produced by the agent is not completely under her control (the investment
returns depend on market conditions also). The principal can not observe
the level of e®ort (the Pension Funds' ability to identify \good investments
opportunities") applied by the agent to perform the task. The principal's
wealth is the revenue produced by the agent net of the reward (the admin-
istration fee Pension Funds receive) for performing the task. The minimum
performance insurance protects the principal against low performances (in-
dividuals are entitled to a minimum return on their balance). See [16], [9],Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 3
[8], [14], [15], [11], [2] and [17].
Since the action chosen by the agent is not observable, a moral hazard
problem arises. The agent chooses the action that maximizes her utility
regardless of the principal's expected wealth. Thus, the agent's choice may
adversely a®ect the principal's wealth.
A widely known result in Principal-Agent theory establishes that an op-
timal risk-sharing reward maximizes the principal's expected wealth. Pro-
posals to apply this result to pension management contracts are already well
known. See [12], [18], [13], [5], [7] and [1].
Caution should be taken when implementing this kind of optimal solu-
tions as it may induce short run risky behavior on Pension Funds' managers,
a culprit in the current ¯nancial crisis. Optimal risk sharing and risk ad-
justed rewards would do the for the present case. See [3] and the shape of
the optimal solution in [6].
However, the current Pension Funds' contract in Colombia establishes
an administration fee of 10% of deposits regardless of the Pension Funds'
investment performance, and establishes a minimum return insurance on
individual accounts balances. Therefore, Colombian Pension Funds lack
contract incentives to apply e®ort in managing the pension accounts. In
fact, Pension Funds' optimal behavior is to enroll high income individuals,
and/or increase the number of enrollees, at the expense of pension accounts
returns.
Moreover, the e±ciency of having a minimum return insurance has not
been studied and is recurrent not only in Colombia but also in other emerging
countries. This note tries to ¯ll this gap.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. In section two we set up
the two models we deal with in this note, the plain-vanilla principal-agent4 J. M. Julio
model and the principal-agent model with minimum performance insurance.
In section three we solve these problems when the principal induces the low-
est e®ort and prove the insurance related ine±ciency for this particular
case. This result shows a second source of ine±ciency in the current Pen-
sion Funds' contract in Colombia. In the fourth, we solve these problems
when the principal induces the highest e®ort and prove the insurance re-
lated ine±ciency for this particular case. This result points to the optimal
solution to be implemented in the Pension Funds' contract. In the appendix
we prove the insurance related ine±ciency in the general setting where there
is a continuum of actions to chose from.
2 Setting Up The Problem
In this section we set up the two models we deal with in this note. In the ¯rst
subsection we review the plain-vanilla two-action principal-agent model. In
the second we bring the minimum performance insurance into the previous
problem. In addition, we formalize the ¯rst source of ine±ciency in the
Colombian Pension Funds' contract.
2.1 The Principal Agent Problem
At the beginning of the period the principal, a risk neutral individual or ¯rm
with bargaining power, o®ers a contract to an agent, a risk averse individual
or ¯rm, to perform a task that produces revenue x to the principal at the
end of the period. The contract determines the reward function, s(), the
agent receives for performing the task.
The agent is free to accept the contract and then, autonomously, choose
the action that maximizes her utility, or give it up to earn a reservation
utility UR. The principal, however, does not take any further action besidesPrincipal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 5
o®ering the contract.
Each of the actions the agent may choose from is mapped into a unique
level of e®ort she applies in performing the task, a = 0 = low e®ort, and
a = 1 = high e®ort. Since revenue is not completely under the agent's
control, conditional on the level of e®ort it has a distribution (X=A = a) »
FX=A=a(x) on X, the set of all possible revenue realizations for a 2 f0;1g.
These distributions are such that the higher the e®ort, the higher the fre-
quency of better results. Thus, the expected revenue function is strictly
increasing on e®ort, E[X=A = 0] < E[X=A = 1]. Moreover, the agent's cost
function is strictly increasing on e®ort, C(0) < C(1).
However, the action the agent chooses is hidden to the principal. The
level of e®ort applied by the agent is not observable and can not be inferred
with certainty from the resulting revenue.
The agent's utility function is separable in money and e®ort, U(s();x;a) =
u(s())¡C(a), where u() is strictly increasing and concave, and continuously
di®erentiable. The conditional distribution functions are de¯ned on X = R,
have the monotone likelihood ratio property and do not have a shifting sup-
port. See [12], [18] and [4].
For a realized revenue x, the ex-post wealth of the principal is the revenue
net of the reward W(x;s()) = x ¡ s(), and, for a given level of e®ort a, the
ex-post utility of the agent is U(s();x;a) = u(s()) ¡ C(a).
The principal chooses the reward function s() that maximizes his ex-
pected wealth in a two step procedure. In the ¯rst step he determines the
optimal reward for each level of e®ort, s0() and s1() respectively, and in the
second he chooses the action that maximizes his expected wealth. In this
way, the principal determines the e®ort he wants to induce the agent to.
Ex ante, given that the principal wants to induce the agent to take action6 J. M. Julio
a, he chooses the reward s() that maximizes his expected wealth
max
s()
E[X ¡ s()=A = a] (1)
However, the agent accepts the contract only if her expected utility net
of costs is higher than her reservation utility, UR. Otherwise, she refuses
the contract and takes an alternative activity earning UR. If the principal
wants the agent to accept the contract, the reward is constrained to
E[u(s())=A = a] ¡ C(a) ¸ UR (2)
which is known as the participation constraint.
If the reward satis¯es the participation constraint, the agent signs the
contract and chooses the e®ort she will apply according to
max
a2f0;1g
E[u(s())=A = a] ¡ C(a) (3)
producing, at the end of the period, an observed level of revenue x from
FX=A=a(x).
However, if the agent chooses 1¡a instead of a, the reward should make
a more appealing to the agent than 1 ¡ a, so s() might also be constrained
to
E[u(s())=A = a] ¡ C(a) > E[u(s)=A = 1 ¡ a] ¡ C(1 ¡ a) (4)
which is known as the incentive compatibility constraint.
Provided the principal induces the agent to take action a, the optimal
solution to the principal-agent problem is denoted as sa() for a 2 f0;1g.
Now we are able to set the following results:
Result 1. If the marginal expected revenue is higher than the marginal
expected optimal reward,
E[X=A = 1] ¡ E[X=A = 0] > E[s1()=A = 1] ¡ E[s0()=A = 0]Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 7
the principal increases his expected wealth by inducing the agent to apply the
highest e®ort. If the marginal expected revenue is lower than the marginal
expected optimal reward, the principal's expected wealth is higher under the
lowest e®ort and he induces the agent to it.
In fact, if E[X=A = 1] ¡ E[X=A = 0] > E[s1()=A = 1] ¡ E[s0()=A =
0], the principal's expected wealth under action a = 1, E[X=A = 1] ¡
E[s1()=A = 1] is strictly higher than his expected wealth under a = 0,
E[X=A = 0] ¡ E[s1()=A = 0].
Result 2. A constant reward satisfying the participation constraint induces
the agent to choose the lowest e®ort, a = 0.
Since the reward is constant, s() = s, the agent's expected utility does
not depend on e®ort, E[u(s)=A = a] = u(s), then, the smaller the cost of
the action, the higher the agent's expected utility, 0 = argmaxa[E[u(s)=A =
a] ¡ C(a)] since C(0) = mina C(a). Then the agent's optimal choice is to
apply the lowest e®ort a = 0.
The current Pension Funds' contract in Colombia establishes an admin-
istration fee of 10% of deposits regardless of both, the funds' investment
performance and the unobserved action. Therefore, the current Colombian
Pension Funds contract induces them to apply the lowest e®ort in managing
the individual pension accounts.
The previous exposition (and the two step procedure), leads to the the
¯rst two problems we deal with in the following two sections:
Problem 1 (The principal induces the lowest level of e®ort). The
principal chooses the reward s() that maximizes his expected wealth subject
to the participation constraint, given a = 0. Solves 1 subject to 2 for a = 0.8 J. M. Julio
Because of result two above, only the participation constraint is required
under a constant reward.
Problem 2 (The principal induces the highest level of e®ort). The
principal chooses the reward s() that maximizes his expected wealth subject to
the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint, given
a = 1. Solves 1 subject to 2 and 4 for a = 1.
2.2 The Minimum Performance Insurance
The agent warrants a minimum level of revenue µ to the principal. If the
realized revenue x is at least µ, the agent receives a reward s(), otherwise
she pays back µ¡x to honor the insurance. Therefore, the reward function,
S(x;µ;s()), splits into an undetermined component, s() when x ¸ µ, and a
completely determined and contingent component, ¡(µ¡x) when x < µ, as
follows
S(x;µ;s()) = s()I[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x) (5)
where IA(x) is the indicator function de¯ned on a set A, IA(x) = 1 if x 2 A
and IA(x) = 0 otherwise.
For a realized revenue x, the ex-post wealth of the principal is the revenue
net of the reward, W(x;µ;S) = x¡S(x;µ;s()), and for a given level of e®ort
a, the ex-post utility of the agent becomes U(S;x;a;µ) = u(S(x;µ;s())) ¡
C(a).
Ex ante, the principal determines the optimal undetermined component
of the contract in a two step procedure. Provided the principal wants to
induce the agent to a, he chooses the undetermined component of the reward,Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 9
s(), that maximizes his expected wealth
max
s()
E[W(x;µ;S)=A = a] ,
max
s()
E[(X ¡ s())=X ¸ µ;A = a]P[X ¸ µ=A = a] +
+µP[X < µ=A = a] (6)
subject to the participation constraint,
E[u(S(x;µ;s()))=A = a] ¡ C(a) ¸ UR ,
E[u(s())=X ¸ µ;A = a]P[X ¸ µ=A = a] +
+E[u(¡(µ ¡ X))=X < µ;A = a]P[X < µ=A = a] ¸ UR + C(a) (7)
and the incentive compatibility constraint
E[u(S(x;µ;s()))=A = a] ¡ C(a) > E[u(S(x;µ;s()))=A = 1 ¡ a] ¡ C(1 ¡ a) ,
E[u(s())=X ¸ µ;A = a]P[X ¸ µ=A = a] +
+E[u(¡(µ ¡ X))=X < µ;A = a]P[X < µ=A = a] ¡ C(a) >
E[u(s())=X ¸ µ;A = 1 ¡ a]P[X ¸ µ=A = 1 ¡ a] +
+E[u(¡(µ ¡ X))=X < µ;A = 1 ¡ a]P[X < µ=A = 1 ¡ a] ¡ C(1 ¡ a) (8)
if required.
Parallel to the two problems above, we establish the problems the prin-
cipal may face in this case:
Problem 3 (The principal induces the lowest level of e®ort). The
principal chooses the undetermined component of the reward, s(), that maxi-
mizes his expected wealth subject to the participation constraint, given a = 0.
Solves 6 subject to 7 for a = 0. Because of result two above only the partic-
ipation constraint is required under a constant reward.10 J. M. Julio
Problem 4 (The principal induces the highest level of e®ort). The
principal chooses the undetermined component of the reward, s(), that max-
imizes his expected wealth subject to the participation constraint and the
incentive compatibility constraint, given a = 1. Solves 6 subject to 7 and 8
for a = 1.
3 The Principal Induces the Lowest E®ort
The marginal expected revenue is lower than the marginal expected optimal
reward. Thus the principal increases his expected wealth by inducing the
agent to choose the lowest e®ort.
Under the assumption that the principal wants to induce the lowest
e®ort, we ¯nd the optimal solution of the plain-vanilla principal-agent prob-
lem and the principal-agent problem with minimum performance insurance.
Based on the result that a constant reward induces the action of lower ef-
fort, we ¯nd, in sub sections one and two, the optimal constant reward for
problems one and three above. The insurance related ine±ciency is shown
in sub section three where we show that the optimal solution of problems
one and three are constant and unique, and show that the insurance reduces
the principal's expected wealth. This is the second source ine±ciency in the
Pension Funds contract in Colombia.
3.1 The Optimal Constant Solution to the Principal-Agent
Model
The principal solves problem one above under the assumption that the re-
ward is constant. If the principal wants to induce the action of lowest e®ort,
he might rely on the previous result to set a constant reward1. The less ex-
1Another approach to see constancy in this case is to resort on the Khun-Tucker ¯rst
order condition,
1
u0(s()) = ¸, 8x 2 X, where ¸ > 0 since the participation constraintPrincipal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 11
pensive constant reward satisfying the participation constraint in problem
one is obtained from this constraint with equality
E[u(s0)=A = 0] ¡ C(0) = UR ,
u(s0) ¡ C(0) = UR ,
which yields
s0 = u¡1(UR + C(0)) (9)
The reward 9 has the agent sign the contract and apply the action of
lowest e®ort a = 0. The agent's expected utility becomes UR, and the
principal's expected wealth becomes
E[W(X;s0)=A = 0] = E[X=A = 0] ¡ u¡1(UR + C(0)) (10)
3.2 The Optimal Constant Solution to The Principal Agent
Problem with Insurance
The principal solves problem three above under the assumption that the
undetermined component of the reward is constant. As the argument above
shows, a constant reward satisfying the participation constraint induces the
agent to choose a = 0. The optimal constant undetermined component of 5
satisfying the participation constraint with equality is




C(0) + UR ¡ E[u(¡(µ ¡ X))=X < µ;A = 0]P[X < µ=A = 0]
P[X ¸ µ=A = 0]
)
8x ¸ µ (11)
is binding. Moreover, since u
0 is decreasing, s() and ¸ are related directly, then s() is
constant.12 J. M. Julio
The reward 5 with s() = si
0 as in 11 has the agent sign the contract and
choose a = 0. The agent's expected utility becomes UR and the principal's
expected wealth under 11 becomes
E[W(x;µ;S)=A = 0] = E[X=A = 0] ¡ E[si
0I[µ;1)(X)=A = 0] +
+ E[(µ ¡ X)I(¡1;µ)(X)=A = 0]
= fE[X=X ¸ µ;A = 0] ¡ si
0gP[X ¸ µ=A = 0] +
+ µP[X < µ=A = 0] (12)
Result 3. The optimal constant undetermined component of the reward in
the principal-agent problem with insurance is given by 5 and the principal's
expected wealth 12 where s() is given by 11.
3.3 Insurance Related Ine±ciency when the Principal In-
duces the Lowest E®ort: The Case of the Colombian
Private Pension Funds
The case just considered describes the current Pension Funds' contract in
Colombia. The reward (10% of deposits), does not depend on the Pension
Funds' investment performance and there is a minimum return warranted by
law on the account balance. Therefore, Pension Funds increase their utility
by applying the lowest e®ort in managing the individual pension accounts.
The Colombian case di®ers slightly from 5 since the constant reward is
charged beforehand. By transforming the warranted return to µ0 = µ¡s we
get to 5 and our analysis holds.
The minimum performance insurance is ine±cient because it reduces
the principal's expected wealth. To prove this statement we have to prove
that the optimal solution to problems one and three above are constant and
unique. Then we are able to prove the statement in this particular case.Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 13





subject to E[u(s())=A = 0] ¸ UR + C(0)
The participation constraint is binding. If it were not, E[u(s())=A =
0] > UR + C(0), and since u¡1 is strictly increasing, u¡1(E[u(s())=A =
0]) > u¡1(UR + C(0)), and since u¡1 is strictly convex, because of Jensen's
inequality, E[s()=A = 0] = E[u¡1(u(s()))=A = 0] > u¡1(UR + C(0)).
However, the constant reward s0 = u¡1(UR + C(0)) satis¯es the partic-
ipation constraint and reduces the expected reward with respect to s(),
s0 = E[s0=A = 0] < E[s()=A = 0]. Then, if the participation constraint
is not binding s() is not optimal. Therefore the participation constraint is
binding.
In¯nitely many reward functions satisfy E[u(s())=A = 0] = UR + C(0).
We argue that the optimal solution is constant and unique, s() = s0. In
fact, if it were not, since it satis¯es the participation constraint and u¡1 is
increasing,
E[u(s())=A = 0] = UR + C(0) ,
u¡1(E[u(s())=A = 0]) = u¡1(UR + C(0)) = s0
and since u¡1 is convex, from Jensen's inequality we obtain
u¡1(UR+C(0)) = u¡1(E[u(s()=A = 0]) · E[u¡1(u(s()))=A = 0] = E[s()=A = 0]
then
s0 = u¡1(UR + C(0)) · E[s()=A = 0]
In Jensen's inequality equality holds if and only if for every line a + bY
tangent to u¡1(y) at y = E[Y=a = 0], P[u¡1(Y ) = a + bY=A = 0] = 1.14 J. M. Julio
Since u¡1 is strictly convex, the only way that P[u¡1(Y ) = a + bY=A =
0] = 1 for every a + bY tangent to u¡1(y) at y = E[Y=A = 0], is that
P[Y = E[Y=A = 0]=A = 0] = 1. That is, P[s() = E[s()=A = 0]=A = 0] = 1.
Then the optimal reward is constant and unique, given by s0() = s0 =
u¡1(UR + C(0)).
Result 4. The optimal solution to the principal-agent problem where the
principal induces the lowest e®ort is constant and unique, given by 9.
Following the same argument it can be shown that the optimal unde-
termined component of the reward for the the principal-agent problem with
minimum performance insurance, where the principal induces the lower ef-
fort, satis¯es the participation constraint with equality
E[u(si
0()I[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x))=A = 0] = UR + C(0) (13)
which leads to 11.
Therefore, the optimal reward under insurance becomes
S(x;µ;si
0) = si





Result 5. The optimal solution to the principal-agent problem with insur-
ance where the agent induces the lowest e®ort is constant and unique, given
by 5 where s is given by 11.
From Jensen's inequality and strict convexity, the second ine±ciency
follows from 13
E[S()=A = 0] = E[u¡1(u(siI[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x)))=A = 0] >
u¡1(E[u(siI[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x))=A = 0]) = u¡1(UR + C(0)) = s0
Therefore, the insurance reduces the expected wealth of the principal.Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 15
Result 6. The principal's expected wealth under insurance is strictly lower
than his expected wealth without insurance when the principal induces the
lowest e®ort.
4 The Principal Induces the Highest E®ort
The marginal expected revenue is higher than the marginal expected optimal
reward. Thus the principal increases his expected wealth by inducing the
agent to choose the highest e®ort.
4.1 The Optimal Solution to the Principal-Agent Model
The principal solves problem two above. A constant reward will not do
since the principal wants to induce a = 1, which is achieved only through
the incentive compatibility constraint.
The necessary and su±cient condition for the optimal solution is the
Khun-Tucker ¯rst order condition
1
u0(s1(x))




8x 2 X, where ¸ and ¹ are the Lagrange multipliers of the participa-
tion and incentive compatibility constraints respectively, and fX=A=a(x) =
dFX=A=a(x)
dx . See [12] and [18].
Both, the participation and incentive compatibility constraints are bind-
ing, that is, ¹ > 0 and ¸ > 0. Since ¹ = 0 is consistent with a constant
reward, ¹ > 0. And ¸ > 0 since otherwise we could ¯nd a better deal still
satisfying the participation constraint. See [12] and [18].
Given that u is strictly concave, u0 is decreasing, then s1() and ¸+¹[1¡
fX=A=0(x)
fX=A=1(x)] are related inversely, and s1() and
fX=A=1(x)
fX=A=0(x) directly. Thus, the
greater the likelihood ratio
fX=A=1(x)
fX=A=0(x) that the action chosen was a = 1, the16 J. M. Julio
greater the reward. In other words, the optimal solution entails risk sharing,
that is, the reward is contingent on revenue, x.
4.2 The Optimal Solution to the Principal-Agent Model with
Insurance
The principal solves problem four above. The reward function is determined
by 5, and the principal determines the optimal undetermined component of
the reward, s(). Since the principal wants to induce the highest e®ort, the
incentive compatibility constraint is in place.








only for x ¸ µ, where ¸ > 0 and ¹ > 0 are the Lagrange multipliers of the
participation and incentive compatibility constraints respectively.
Therefore, the optimal solution entails risk sharing 8x ¸ µ, and the
reward becomes
S(x;µ;s) = si
1(x)I[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x)
where si
1(x) satis¯es the ¯rst order condition 8x ¸ µ. Otherwise S(x;µ;s)
is completely determined and contingent on x.
4.3 Insurance Related Ine±ciency when the Principal In-
duces the Highest E®ort
The e±ciency of contracting the insurance is determined by comparing the
expected principal's wealth with and without the minimum performance
insurance.
Let us rewrite the maximization problem of the principal-agent with




E[X ¡ S()=A = 1]
subject to the participation constraint
E[u(S())=A = 1] ¡ C(1) ¸ UR
the incentive compatibility constraint
E[u(S())=A = 1] ¡ C(1) > E[u(S())=A = 0] ¡ C(0)
and the insurance constraint
S() = s()I[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x)
By writing the problem this way we have proved that the maximization
set under the minimum performance insurance
Sw = fS() : E[u(S())=A = 1] ¡ C(1) ¸ UR;
E[u(S())=A = 1] ¡ C(1) > E[u(S())=A = 0] ¡ C(0); and
S() = s()I[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x)g
is strictly contained in the plain-vanilla principal-agent maximization set
S = fS() : E[u(S())=A = 1] ¡ C(1) ¸ UR; and
E[u(S())=A = 1] ¡ C(1) > E[u(S())=A = 0] ¡ C(0)g
Therefore, since the minimum performance insurance imposes a partic-
ular behavior to the reward function S() for x < µ, the expected principal's
wealth with insurance is lower than or equal than without it,
E[W(x;µ;S())=A = 1] · E[W(x;s())=A = 1]18 J. M. Julio
Equality of the maximized expected wealth with and without minimum
performance insurance is possible under strong restrictions. For instance, [6]
propose an optimal linear risk sharing reward function of the form s(x) = ±+
°x for the principal-agent problem. However, for the minimum performance
insurance to be optimal under this linear reward schedule, ± = ¡µ and ° = 1
for x < µ, a strong constraint even under this kind of reward.
However, an unconstrained linear reward schedule would increase the
principal's expected wealth with respect to the current Colombian contract.
Result 7. The principal's expected wealth under insurance is lower than or
equal than his expected wealth without insurance when the principal induces
the highest e®ort.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
5.1 Conclusion
A minimum return insurance reduces the principal's expected wealth and
a constant reward induces the agent to the lowest e®ort. Because of these
ine±ciencies, Colombian pension savers have been cumulating a wealth loss
since the introduction of the Individual Accounts with Solidarity system in
Colombia in 1993.
An optimal linear risk sharing reward schedule like [6] would improve the
Pension Funds' contract in Colombia. However, caution should be taken in
applying these kind of reward schedules as they may induce short run risky
behavior on Pension Funds managers. A linear risk adjusted reward schedule
may be more appropriate under these circumstances, and would agree with
the current proposal of introducing risk varying funds. See [15].Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 19
5.2 Policy Implications
² The minimum return insurance in the Pension Funds' contract should
be eliminated as it is wealth reducing to the principal.
² A risk-sharing reward program to induce the conformance of Pension
Funds' actions to pension savers' interests should be established.
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Appendix
A Insurance Related Ine±ciency in the General
Setting
Consider now the case in which there is a continuum of possible actions
the agent may choose from, a 2 A, which correspond to a continuum of
possible levels of e®ort, where A is a compact subset of R. The optimal
reward schedule in the plain-vanilla principal-agent problem is obtained by




E[X ¡ S()=A = a]
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
a 2 argmax
a E[u(S())=A = a] ¡ C(a)
and the participation constraint
E[u(S())=A = a] ¡ C(a) ¸ UR
which has an optimization set
S = f(S();a) : a 2 A; E[u(S())=A = a] ¡ C(a) ¸ UR; and
a 2 argmax
a E[u(S())=A = a] ¡ C(a)g
However, the optimization set under the insurance is
Sw = f(S();a) : a 2 A; E[u(S())A = a] ¡ C(a) ¸ UR; and
a 2 argmax
a
E[u(S())=A = a] ¡ C(a);
S() = s()I[µ;1)(x) ¡ (µ ¡ x)I(¡1;µ)(x)g
which is strictly contained in S.Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance 23
Therefore, since the insurance imposes a particular behavior to the re-
ward function S() for x < µ, the principal's expected wealth under the in-
surance is lower than or equal than under the plain vanilla principal-Agent
problem.
Moreover, under the assumptions
1.
R y
¡1 FX=A=a(x)dx is non decreasing convex in a 8y 2 X.
2. E[X=A = a] is non decreasing concave in a.
3.
dfX=A=a(x)=da
fX=A=a(x) is non decreasing convex in x 8a
4. u(u0¡1(1=z)) is concave 8z > 0
the ¯rst order conditions approach to the maximization problem above holds.
In this case the Khun-Tucker ¯rst order condition is
1
u0(s())




Therefore, under these assumptions a reward schedule satisfying 15 is
optimal, and the insurance is wealth reducing to the principal. See [10].
However, the ¯rst order conditions approach as described above does not
work under arbitrary distribution functions FX=A=a(x). A class of distribu-
tion functions that satisfy the ¯st two assumptions above are the exponential
family in an appropriate parametrization
fX=A=a = µ(x)Ã(a)e®(a)¯(x)
where ® and ¯ are non decreasing, ¯(x) is concave, and the expected revenue
function is concave. See [10].